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Two centuries of economic development 
show that spatial disparities in income and 
production are inevitable. A generation of 
economic research confirms this: there is no 
good reason to expect economic growth to 
spread smoothly across space … . Countries 
far from world markets face the stiffest chal-
lenges to economic growth and need a strong 
commitment for cooperative solutions. 
World Development Report, 2009
1. Introduction
International economic development assistance to 
Solomon Islands has recently undergone an impor-
tant ‘transition’. The Regional Assistance Mission to 
the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) ten-year post-conflict 
stabilisation intervention is coming to an end, and 
bilateral and multilateral donors have now taken 
over key RAMSI functions in economic manage-
ment. The international community is moving its 
focus from stabilisation and security towards longer 
term development needs, under more conventional 
modalities of support (Coppel 2012). 
Substantial gains in economic management have 
been achieved under RAMSI’s watch, and significant 
progress has been made towards economic 
recovery following the outright economic collapse 
accompanying the ‘tension’. By all except the most 
uncharitable accounts, RAMSI’s specific mandate 
to stabilise government finances has been met. In 
terms of the broader mandate to ‘promote longer 
term economic recovery’, many signs are positive. 
Per capita incomes in Solomon Islands have recently 
exceeded pre-tension levels for the first time. It 
might now be tempting for policy makers in those 
countries that contributed to RAMSI to conclude 
that an economic transition has been effected: that 
the Solomon Islands economy has been ‘fixed’ and 
is now on a path towards self-sufficiency. 
This paper assesses the extent of economic 
transition in Solomon Islands since the tension 
and draws policy implications for the international 
community. I argue that while important advances 
in living standards have been achieved, there is 
little evidence of structural economic change that 
would be sufficient to support significant and 
sustainable improvements in growth. After a decade 
of unprecedented investment in strengthening 
state institutions, expanding services, and building 
infrastructure, and despite strong growth over recent 
years, the economy shows no signs of diversification, 
with the private sector increasingly clustered around 
unsustainable logging and the Honiara bureaucracy, 
and the current account deficit thoroughly 
entrenched. 
These realities should not be taken as evidence 
of failure. Rather, they demonstrate the need to 
redefine success. Economic self-sufficiency achieved 
within Solomon Islands’ geographical boundaries is 
not a useful goal for a small, isolated, and dispersed 
economy. Rather, Solomon Islands and those sup-
porting its development should follow the lead of 
other small island economies that have achieved 
substantial and durable improvements in living 
standards by pursuing deeper economic integra-
tion with larger economies, including through shar-
ing service delivery and regulatory responsibilities 
and working to remove constraints to cross-border 
movements of people, capital, goods and services. 
Such integration offers potential benefits both to 
Solomon Islanders and also to the broader region.
In the first half of this paper, I review recent 
economic developments in Solomon Islands. In 
section two, I summarise the 
many improvements to economic 
conditions and the business 
environment achieved since 
RAMSI’s arrival and the end of 
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the tension. In section three, I assess the extent 
to which these improvements in the business 
environment have translated into improved 
economic performance. I show that headline 
economic growth figures paint a misleading picture 
regarding the extent and quality of economic 
development, with the economy still concentrated 
around unsustainable logging and the Honiara 
service economy. In section four, I identify two 
major upcoming challenges to improved living 
standards inherent in Solomon Islands’ current 
trajectory of development: the projected exhaustion 
of natural forest stocks, and the emerging pressures 
on living standards and social cohesion that are 
accompanying rapid urbanisation in the context of 
limited economic opportunities. 
In the second half of the paper, I suggest that 
increased economic integration represents the 
best prospects for managing upcoming challenges 
and achieving durable improvements in living 
standards. In section five, I assess the prospects 
for broad-based private-sector development 
in Solomon Islands. Based on global growth 
dynamics and the experiences of other small 
states, I argue that the underlying realities of 
economic geography will continue to constrain 
opportunities for self-sustaining, private sector-
led growth, and that alternative economic 
development strategies will, therefore, be needed to 
manage future pressures. In section six, I suggest 
that the international community therefore has 
a key role to play in Solomon Islands’ ongoing 
economic development. In the short term, donors 
can explicitly prioritise measures to support a 
successful transition to mining and ensure sufficient 
expansion in economic opportunities to defuse the 
immediate risks inherent in continued Honiara-
centric development. Over the longer term, the 
international community should pursue broader, 
deeper economic integration between Solomon 
Islands and nearby large economies, including 
through shared responsibilities for delivery of state 
functions and increased factor mobility. 
2. Achievements
Conditions for economic activity in Solomon 
Islands have improved since the tension. But these 
improvements have been uneven and piecemeal, 
largely reflecting the capacity and mandate of the 
RAMSI mission.
Conflict and Security
Conflict and breakdown of law and order were the 
most significant contributors to economic contrac-
tion during the tension. The success of the peace-
keeping intervention in quickly ending the conflict 
and restoring security and basic services in Honiara 
and provincial centres is well established (Coppel 
2012; Dinnen 2008). The rapid disarmament of 
militants, the resumption of government services, 
and restoration of the conditions required for basic 
economic activity was an important contributor 
to economic recovery (Porter et al. 2010). Recent 
evidence suggests very few businesses in Honiara 
now consider the security situation to be a major 
constraint on business activity (Haque and Greig 
2011). Greater confidence in the security situation 
is reflected in new investment in the mining, agri-
culture, tourism, and fisheries sectors. But access to 
the police and judiciary, especially outside of Honi-
ara, remains a constraint to some business activi-
ties, with high costs and long delays associated 
with using the court system (Allen et al. 2013). The 
annual People’s Surveys indicate that the majority 
of Solomon Islanders does not feel safe, and fear 
a return to violence following the withdrawal of 
RAMSI’s security presence (ANU Enterprise 2013).
Macroeconomic Management
RAMSI’s explicit mandate to achieve 
macroeconomic stabilisation has been met — 
with the help of a large external presence within 
the Ministry of Finance — but the structural 
imbalances that have long characterised the 
Solomon Islands economy remain. Following 
a history of large fiscal deficits financed by 
domestic and international borrowing, budgets 
have come close to balance in most years since 
the tension, with relatively significant surpluses 
in 2011 and 2012 (IMF 2013). Improvements in 
public financial management systems, emphasising 
fiduciary control, have eased cashflow problems 
and underpinned the successful imposition of 
budget discipline. Revenue growth has been 
impressive. As a proportion of GDP, non-grant 
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GDP in 2003 to 34.5 per cent of GDP in 2012 — 
substantially higher than pre-tension levels.1 Given 
the pace of economic growth, this translates to real 
growth over the period of more than 170 per cent. 
Concerted revenue collection efforts at customs and 
within the tax divisions, combined with systems 
improvements, have allowed an expansion of 
resources for delivery of public services even while 
deficits have been narrowed (IMF 2013). 
Total public sector debt has declined from 73 per 
cent of GDP in 2004 to just 15 per cent in 2012, with 
Solomon Islands’ risk of debt distress downgraded 
from ‘high’ to ‘medium’ by the IMF and the World 
Bank in 2010 (IMF 2010). Despite external shocks 
and strong demand growth accompanying recovery, 
inflation has remained at similar levels to the imme-
diate pre-tension period, averaging around 8.5 per 
cent per annum since 2003, and peaking at 17 per 
cent during the food and fuel crisis in 2008. While 
the exchange rate has been successfully maintained 
at the US dollar peg, local inflation has contributed 
to a significant increase in the real exchange rate 
(around 22 per cent) and an associated decline in 
competitiveness. The Central Bank of Solomon 
Islands has recently moved to more flexible exchange 
rate arrangements, utilising a pegged basket against a 
range of major trading currencies. 
The budget remains highly reliant on grants, 
even for the existing inadequate level of service 
delivery. The structural current account deficit 
shows no signs of narrowing, and has in fact wid-
ened on average during the years of the RAMSI 
intervention. It is purely due to donor flows that 
foreign exchange reserves remain at comfortable 
levels (IMF 2013). 
Business Environment Reform
Since 2003, Solomon Islands has also been subjected 
to the full gamut of donor-driven business envi-
ronment reforms. These have proceeded at pace, 
enabled by capacity supplementation from RAMSI 
advisors within the Ministry of Finance. Business 
reforms have progressed in relation to state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) privatisation and governance 
reform, overhaul of the tariff structure to achieve 
consistency with obligations under international 
trade agreements, rationalisation of the tax struc-
ture, and liberalisation of the telecommunications 
and air transport sectors (RAMSI 2013). A new 
Companies Act has been implemented, along with 
a new Companies Registry and a Secured Transac-
tions Act to allow for the use of movable property 
Figure 1: Contribution to GDP Growth
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as collateral. The Foreign Investment Act has been 
revised, streamlining processes for foreign invest-
ment, and immigration approval processes revised to 
improve access to overseas skilled labour (IFC 2013). 
These reforms have led to substantial improvements 
in some areas, including reductions in the cost and 
time taken to open a business and register property 
through formal channels. Nonetheless, after a dec-
ade of concerted effort, Solomon Islands is ranked 
111th of 180 countries in the 2013 Doing Business 
survey (IFC 2013). Aspiring entrepreneurs will still 
face a wait of three months to receive a construction 
permit, and five months to have their business con-
nected to the local grid (IFC 2013).
3. Economic Developments
Gains in security have supported important improve-
ments in living standards and incomes. Per capita 
output of the Solomon Islands economy has grown 
at an average rate of 3.6 per cent per annum over the 
past decade. This compares to an average small Pacif-
ic country per capita growth rate of 0.6 per cent. But 
improved management has had an at-best limited 
impact in effecting structural change and diversifica-
tion in the Solomon Islands economy or establishing 
a foundation for broad-based growth. 
Recovery
The resumption of economic activity following the 
success of the RAMSI security intervention has been 
the single most important driver of growth (IMF 
2009). Between 1997 and 2002, the Solomon Islands 
economy contracted by up to 60 per cent in real 
terms. This contraction reflected the impact of a gen-
eral breakdown of formal and informal institutions 
underpinning economic activity, as Honiara-based 
businesses ceased operating, activity at the Gold 
Ridge mine came to a standstill, and logging activity 
slowed in the context of widespread insecurity and 
violence (Moore 2004). The RAMSI intervention and 
ongoing security guarantee has both restored ade-
quate security for economic activity and provided a 
vital source of confidence for investors. The extent to 
which recent strong growth performance represents 
simple recovery from the disruption of the tensions 
— rather than an expansion in productive capacity 
— is reflected in the fact that per capita incomes are 
thought to have recovered to 1998 levels only within 
the past two years, as shown in Figure 2. 
Logging and Public Sector Expenditure
Resumption of peace and security has coincided 
with high global log prices. Logging output has 
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Figure 2: Change in Real GDP and Real Per Capita GDP
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increased by around 70 per cent since 2003, peak-
ing at historically high levels in 2012. Increases in 
logging output since 2003 have directly contrib-
uted around a quarter of economic growth. There 
is a strong correlation between logging output and 
overall real growth, as shown in Figure 3.
Growth has also been fuelled by rapid expansion 
in public expenditure, much of it financed by aid. 
Aid flows have increased from 16 per cent of GDP 
in 2004, to peak at 30 per cent of GDP in 2011, 
more than doubling in real terms. (This compares 
to an average of around 1 per cent of GDP for 
lower-middle income countries globally). Real 
public expenditure has increased by more than 
180 per cent since 2003, while direct public sector 
employment has increased by around 80 per cent. 
Increased numbers of public servants and an influx 
of aid bureaucrats, diplomats, and consultants 
have fuelled the emergence of a vibrant service 
economy in Honiara. Increased public expenditure 
has broadened opportunities for firms supplying 
donor contracts. The relationship between changes 
in public expenditure and non-logging, non-
agricultural output is shown in Figure 4. 
Continuity and Concentration
Despite rapid growth, composition of current 
output provides cause for skepticism regarding any 
structural transformation of the Solomon Islands 
economy. Logging output has remained fairly 
consistent as a share of the economy over time, 
at 15.8 per cent of GDP in 2013, compared to an 
average of 15.3 per cent since 1971. Subsistence 
and agricultural production comprise around 34 
per cent of output in 2013  — remarkably close 
to the long-run average of 36 per cent since 
1971 (although with an increasing proportion 
of agricultural output for monetary exchange 
following a spike in subsistence production during 
the tension). Manufacturing output — often a 
primary target for increased investment under 
business regulatory reforms — has actually declined 
in relative and absolute terms since the tensions, 
accounting for around 2.5 per cent of output, 
compared to 3.3 per cent in 1971. 
Due to the continued reliance on traditional 
sources of growth, the benefits of economic 
recovery have been unevenly shared. Logging 
remains dominated by foreign — largely Malaysian 
— firms, utilising unsustainable extraction 
methods that require minimal capital investment 
or local employment generation (Porter et al. 
2010). Opportunities for domestic processing or 
value adding have not been pursued. Landowning 
communities have also often been deprived of 
potential benefits from resource forestry and 
Figure 3: Change in Real GDP and Change in Logging Output
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exposed to additional costs, due to the limited 
regulatory reach of government. Logging firms 
have often been able to bypass established processes 
and exploit overlapping customary property right 
regimes to gain access to forest resources and 
minimise or altogether avoid compensation to land 
owners. Environmental damage has been extensive, 
imposing hidden economic costs in terms of 
damage to subsistence systems (Kabutaulaka 2008).
Growth from public sector expansion has, in 
many respects, had a more positive impact. The 
Honiara economy is vibrant and employment 
opportunities are growing. Opportunities created 
by aid and government spending and employment 
are being exploited by both migrants from other 
parts of the country and long-term residents 
(Haque and Greig 2011). Previous analysis has 
highlighted the extent to which women are 
also taking advantage of new entrepreneurial 
opportunities in the context of urban economic 
growth. But the benefits of Honiara’s growth are 
highly geographically concentrated (Haque and 
Greig 2011). Most manufactured goods consumed 
in Honiara are imported from overseas, with 
Honiara’s consumption weakly linked to production 
across the broader Solomon Islands economy 
(notable exceptions being agricultural production 
for market sales and betel nut). 
4. Emerging Challenges
Against this backdrop of uneven recovery and 
continued economic concentration, Solomon 
Islands faces two emerging challenges. Firstly, the 
exhaustion of forest stocks is a major threat to 
an economy that has relied so heavily on logging 
for employment, foreign exchange, and growth. 
Secondly, with limited growth prospects beyond 
various extractive industries and the Honiara service 
economy, rapid urbanisation fuelled by a fast-
growing youth population poses significant risks.
The End of Logging
There is increasing certainty that the long-
predicted collapse in logging output will occur over 
coming years as natural forest stocks are exhausted 
(IMF 2013). This outcome reflects a long history 
of unsustainable and unregulated extraction (Gay 
2009). The economic impacts will be significant. 
The logging industry currently employs around 
7,000 Solomon Islanders. Logs account for 
nearly 60 per cent of exports. Revenues from log 
exports are equal to around 16 per cent of non-
grant revenues (IMF 2013; Porter et al. 2010). As 
previously discussed, overall growth has tended 
to be strongly correlated with logging output, 
reflecting the importance of cash income from 
logging to broader economic activity in rural areas. 
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Figure 4: Change in Public Spending and Non-Logging Output
ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm                                                                                                 7 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2013/10
PR
O
O
F 
3
Government strategy for managing this 
transition has never been explicit. If recent efforts 
to improve the business environment had delivered 
a broader expansion of private sector opportunities, 
the challenge might have been easier to manage. 
As it is, the best prospect for managing the end of 
logging is successful development of alternative 
natural resource industries.
New developments in the mining sector have 
therefore, recently attracted much attention. The 
scale of potential operations is very significant. The 
prospective Isabel operation would initially involve 
direct shipping of unprocessed ore. A refinery facil- 
ity may be developed, involving US$1.25 billion 
of investment and exporting approximately 30,000 
tonnes of nickel per year. Exports could be worth 
US$460 million per year and Sumitomo estimate 
that more than 1000 jobs could be created. Recent 
mineral exploration has identified possible 
future development including copper and gold 
on Guadalcanal, Vella Lavella, and New Georgia 
islands. In addition, the seabed surrounding 
the Solomon Islands is considered likely to have 
deposits of copper, gold, and zinc.
There are many factors that could forestall such 
investment, perhaps indefinitely. These include 
perennial contestation over land rights, ongoing 
absence of regulatory and policy certainty required 
for large investments, and price fluctuations in 
global commodity markets. But even if potential 
mining investment was to be fully realised, 
favorable economic outcomes for Solomon Islands 
are far from assured. 
A large cross-country literature highlights the 
risks associated with large-scale mining investment 
(Sachs and Warner 2001; Ross 2004; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004). Particular cause for concern in 
the Solomon Islands’ context is evidence that 
mining activities contribute to conflict pressures. 
Geographical concentration of economic 
opportunities, contestation over mining rents, and 
associated perceptions of inequity can fuel existing 
grievances and deepen divisions (Ross 2004). 
Armed conflicts triggered by mining activities in 
Papua New Guinea have imposed substantial social 
and economic costs and frustrated progress towards 
state-building. Some commentators have, in fact, 
argued that Melanesian contexts may be more 
prone to resource-related conflict, due to very weak 
state capacity and legitimacy, pronounced ethnic 
divisions, and the tendency for broader social and 
economic contests — especially over land and 
economic opportunities — to manifest in conflict 
over natural resource rents (Dinnen, Porter, and 
Sage 2010; Banks, 2008). None of this bodes well 
given Solomon Islands’ recent history of conflict, 
fraught Honiara–provincial relationships, very weak 
capacity within key regulatory agencies to enforce 
regulations or ensure fair treatment of landowners, 
and the demonstrated ability of those in control of 
resource wealth to directly influence policy in their 
own interests. 
International evidence also shows that many 
governments forgo a large proportion of potential 
fiscal benefits of mining operations (arguably 
including the Solomon Islands Government in 
relation to the Gold Ridge mine) (Sachs and 
Warner 2010). With stark differences in capacity 
between resource investors and the government 
agencies responsible for negotiating and enforcing 
revenue sharing and taxation arrangements, it is 
often difficult for small country governments to 
ensure a fair deal. Even when revenues have been 
captured by governments, they have often not 
been used in ways that support long-term growth, 
due to widespread weaknesses in public financial 
management systems and political dynamics that 
encourage short-termism in the management of 
fiscal resources (Sachs and Warner 2001). 
The potential negative governance impacts of 
resource reliance are well documented in regional 
and Solomon Islands–specific literature (Dinnen 
et al. 2010). Allen (2011), Kabutaulaka (2008), 
and Craig and Porter (2013) have documented 
the extent to which rent flows from logging 
activities pervade politics, financing patronage 
and eroding political accountability for service 
delivery. Transition to mining may exacerbate the 
current corrosive impacts of natural resource rents 
on political governance. Of particular concern 
within the current political-economy context is the 
possibility that a resource boom would increase 
fiscal space for greater allocations to so-called 
Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) — funds 
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provided to individual members of parliament 
for use at their discretion, and with very limited 
accountability or reporting requirements, and most 
commonly used to secure the political support 
of constituents through the transfer of cash and 
private goods. While opinions differ as to the extent 
to which channeling of resources through CDFs 
constitutes wastage of public resources, there can 
be little doubt that substantial growth of CDFs 
in the absence of increased investment in public 
goods through government systems would further 
corrode the influence and legitimacy of central 
government institutions and deepen the dominance 
of patronage-driven politics (Haque 2011; Craig and 
Porter 2013).
Job creation associated with mining activity is 
likely to be limited, relative to the jobs currently 
provided by logging, and geographically concen-
trated around sites of resource extraction, given the 
difficulty of developing backwards supply chains in 
Solomon Islands’ high-cost economy. A key chal-
lenge for Solomon Islands is, therefore, to convert 
potential mining investment income into a sustain-
able source of financing for vital service delivery 
and infrastructure, while avoiding unreasonable 
environmental and social costs, and sharing bene-
fits widely enough to avoid resentment and conflict. 
Urbanisation and Demographic Pressures
Rapid expansion of Honiara’s population over the 
coming years poses further challenges to stabil-
ity and improved living standards. While Solomon 
Islands’ population remains overwhelmingly rural, 
Honiara is growing at a rapid pace, even compared 
to large Asian cities. Between 1999 and 2009, the 
Honiara population grew at an average rate of 4.7 
per cent per annum (Solomon Islands Govern-
ment 2012). Much of this growth has occurred 
in the peri-urban areas, beyond Honiara’s formal 
borders, reflecting problems with housing access 
within formal town boundaries. Solomon Islands’ 
current economic development trajectory provides 
little reason to believe that the pace of urbanisation 
will slow. The public sector in Honiara accounts 
for a large proportion of formal sector jobs, and 
the Honiara service economy provides the best 
prospects of paid employment for many Solo-
mon Islanders (World Bank 2013). The number 
of Solomon Islanders between the ages of 15–24 
is expected to double between 2011 and 2020 (as 
shown in Figure 5). As social attitudes and expecta-
tions change, including through the spread of new 
telecommunications technologies, a growing youth 
population seems more likely to prefer the search 
for social and economic opportunities in Honiara, 
Figure 5: Change in 15–24 yo Population 2011–2020
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however poor the conditions, over the monotony, 
physical exertion, and isolation of rural life. 
Urbanisation has many benefits to offer 
Solomon Islands (World Bank 2009). Firms in 
urban areas can benefit from the greater availability 
of goods and skills required for production, 
knowledge spillovers, better infrastructure, and 
a large, proximate customer base. The associated 
productivity benefits can lead to employment 
growth and higher incomes. These proximity 
benefits are clearly observable within Honiara’s 
vibrant service economy. When driven by the 
productivity benefits associated with density and 
concentration, the prospects of better quality 
jobs, and an escape from the insecurity of rural 
agriculture, urbanisation is a key driver of 
economic development. Urbanisation has inevitably 
accompanied income growth around the world 
(World Bank 2009). Urbanisation also provides an 
opportunity for governments to achieve economies 
of scale in service delivery and infrastructure 
provision, reducing unit costs and allowing 
improved quality and access. Both of these potential 
benefits are already apparent in survey data from 
Honiara, where residents are far more likely to 
have access to paid employment and basic services 
than those living in rural areas (Solomon Islands 
Government 2012). 
But urbanisation also brings costs and risks, 
especially when it is occurring for the wrong 
reasons. Some urbanisation in Solomon Islands is 
being driven not by the productivity and income 
benefits of concentration, but by inadequate 
services in rural areas, low agricultural productivity, 
vulnerability to price shocks and natural disasters, 
and declines in rural living standards associated with 
population pressures on subsistence systems in some 
areas (Connell 2011; Storey 2003). Urbanisation of 
this nature leads to congestion of public services and 
infrastructure, and is associated with high youth 
unemployment and frustrated aspirations for social 
mobility, feeding into increased rates of substance 
abuse, crime, and loss of social cohesion (World 
Bank 2009; World Bank 2013). Such outcomes are 
readily observed across the Pacific and especially 
in the squatter settlements of Melanesia (Connell 
2011). The breakdown in family structures and 
informal social safety net systems as young people 
Figure 6: Output Growth and Urban Growth 1991–2011
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move to cities has led to unprecedented levels of 
inequality (Monsell-Davis, 1993). Associated strains 
on social cohesion are very apparent in survey 
data, with Honiara residents — and especially 
those in peri-urban areas — reporting far higher 
levels of substance abuse, exposure to crime, and 
dissatisfaction with the conduct of government, 
including in relation to policing, corruption, and 
security, than those in rural areas (Solomon Islands 
Government 2013; ANU Enterprises 2012). 
Expanding the economic opportunities avail-
able to Solomon Islanders is central to managing 
the pressures of urbanisation. Urbanisation driven 
by opportunity can lead to a self-perpetuating cycle 
of productivity growth and improving living stand-
ards. But without sufficient economic opportunities, 
the impacts of urbanisation may be catastrophic. A 
young, concentrated, idle, and disenchanted popula-
tion poses huge challenges for social cohesion in any 
context, as the experience of nearby Port Moresby 
vividly illustrates. Such challenges would be even 
more difficult to manage if political, provincial ten-
sions were to emerge over the inadequately regulated 
development of mining resources or the uneven dis-
tribution of associated benefits and opportunities. 
5. Prospects for Transition
How can the economic opportunities required to 
address mounting pressures be provided? Further 
improving the business environment is often cited 
as the critical requirement for generating investment 
and increased economic opportunities for Solomon 
Islanders. Donor reports often stress the exhaustive 
list of legal, regulatory, policy, institutional, and 
infrastructure reforms required to create an 
environment attractive to investment and facilitative 
of productivity (ADB 2010; Gay 2009). Implicit 
in these recommendations is the expectation that, 
with the correct policy and regulatory settings, 
spontaneous private sector growth would occur at a 
pace sufficient to deliver the required job creation.2 
Current dynamics of global economic 
development and, particularly, the historical 
experience of small states might give cause for 
caution in this regard. Globally, forces of economic 
geography are driving increasing geographical 
unevenness in productivity and production, with 
negative implications for the competitiveness of 
small and dispersed economies. At the same time, 
Solomon Islands’ lack of scale and concentration 
increases the costs of delivery public services, 
infrastructure and institutions, compounding 
competitive disadvantage. The experience of other 
small island states reflects these realities. While 
high living standards have often been achieved, 
it has seldom been through adopting the policy 
prescriptions currently dominating discussions of 
economic development in Solomon Islands. 
Agglomeration and Productivity
The disadvantages facing small island economies 
are well established in economic literature. Small 
domestic markets impede the achievement of 
economies of scale in production for local markets, 
while very high transport costs choke off opportu-
nities for competitive exporting (Armstrong and 
Reid 2006; Redding and Venables 2004; Radelet 
and Sachs 1998). With little reduction in transport 
costs over recent decades, and some evidence that 
trade costs are increasing for countries isolated 
from major trade routes, there is little evidence that 
globalisation is in any way reducing the relevance 
of geography to economic development prospects 
(Hummels 2011; Yang et al. 2013).
In fact, global economic dynamics are work-
ing to exacerbate the disadvantages faced by small 
states. Economic activity is increasingly unevenly 
disbursed geographically, with 1.5 per cent of the 
world’s land area now accounting for 50 per cent 
of global production, and large cities accounting 
for 80 per cent of global production (World Bank 
2009). Populations are similarly unevenly distribut-
ed, with populations increasingly concentrating in 
urban areas, and the majority of the world’s popu-
lation now living in cities. This pattern of uneven 
development, with population and productivity 
highly concentrated, is repeated across regions, 
countries, and areas within countries. Recent eco-
nomic research has provided compelling evidence 
regarding the causes of continued concentration 
(World Bank 2009). When located close to other 
firms and large, dense populations, firms are able to 
realise economies of scale with easy access to large 
markets. Firms are able to specialise, with the abil-
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ity to outsource upwards and downwards through 
the supply-chain. Firms also experience greater 
exposure to positive knowledge externalities, by 
being able to observe the practice of other firms 
and having access to a pool of workers with experi-
ence in different firms and industries. Higher pro-
ductivity allows higher incomes and wages, which 
attract workers, fuelling a self-perpetuating cycle of 
increasing concentration and urbanisation that has 
been synonymous with development internationally 
and over time (Venables 2006; World Bank 2009).
The consequence of these powerful economic 
forces is that development is uneven — some spaces 
(regions, countries, and areas within countries) are 
becoming wealthier while others are getting left 
behind (World Bank 2009). Crucially, this growing 
unevenness can only be counteracted by policy to 
a very limited extent. The efficiency benefits that 
come from a relatively low-cost business regula-
tory environment are dwarfed by the productiv-
ity benefits of concentration, while policy-driven 
attempts to redistribute economic activity through 
public investment programs and investment incen-
tives have a very poor record globally (World 
Bank 2009). Importantly, policy measures aimed 
at increasing economic openness may exacerbate, 
rather than counteract, global trends towards con-
centration — businesses in lagging areas may lose 
competitiveness in the face of imports from firms 
located in areas of economic concentration.
The relevance of these facts to Solomon Islands 
development prospects is obvious. Recent work by 
the World Bank has highlighted the uniqueness of 
Pacific island countries in terms of their combined 
small population sizes and long distances to global 
economic production, as shown in Figure 7 (World 
Bank 2011). Costs of trade between Pacific island 
countries and large markets are much higher, as 
a proportion of export value, than for countries 
like Australia or New Zealand. Even within the 
Pacific, however, Solomon Islands faces unusual 
geographical obstacles due to the extent to which its 
population is dispersed widely, with low population 
density over many islands. The agglomeration index 
provides one potential measure of this dispersal, 
constituting an aggregate measure of urban 
population share, population density, and travel 
times to urban centres. Solomon Islands, with a 
Figure 7: Size and Isolation — All States
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score of 6.9 (with a maximum possible score of 100) 
is among the lowest scoring globally and among 
small states, as shown in Figure 8. The average 
Solomon Islander lives more than 200 kilometers 
from Honiara, indicating far greater population 
dispersal than other Pacific island states such as Fiji, 
Samoa, and Tonga (Craig and Porter 2013). 
Geography and Public Goods
Solomon Islands’ small and dispersed population 
also constrains delivery of the public goods and 
services on which private businesses depend. Many 
public goods and services exhibit economies of 
scale. Solomon Islands’ smallness increases the unit 
costs of providing many public services, due to the 
high fixed costs involved. A road, energy network, 
hospital, or government ministry that serves 
550,000 people (or a few thousand people, at the 
island or province level) is likely to have a higher 
cost per user than one that serves several million 
people because the associated fixed costs — costs of 
administration and certain capital costs — must be 
spread across a smaller number of people. Higher 
costs mean that it is more difficult for governments 
in small countries to provide the public goods on 
which the private sector relies. The absence of 
economies of scale in Solomon Islands is clearly 
reflected in measures of infrastructure coverage and 
quality, as highlighted in the World Bank’s 2010 
work on growth prospects and shown in Figure 9. 
Small population size also has important impli-
cations for public sector capacity (Baker 1992; 
Haque et al. 2013; Brown 2010). While many low-
income countries face capacity constraints in vari-
ous areas of government, a dedicated literature 
highlights particular barriers to capacity develop-
ment for public sector administration in small 
country settings. Public services in small countries, 
while large relative to the population, are often 
small in absolute terms. Given that many adminis-
trative and service delivery functions involve large 
fixed costs, small country administrations often 
have too few people with the right skills to carry out 
all required functions. With small populations and 
weak education systems, public agencies are some-
times simply unable to recruit people with the right 
skills for specialised roles. This problem can be 
exacerbated when those who attain specialist skills 
within government are often attracted to broader 
overseas job opportunities in contexts where ‘only a 
few brains need be drained before a serious systemic 
crisis occurs’ (Baker 1992b, 16). Recent quantitative 
research has showed how these problems manifest 
in weaker public financial management perfor-
mance in Pacific contexts relative to larger countries 
at similar levels of income (Haque et al. 2013). 
Figure 8: Agglomeration Index — Smallest States
So
lo
m
on
 Is
la
nd
s
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm                                                                                                 13 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2013/10
PR
O
O
F 
3
Experience of Small States
Overall, geography constrains private sector 
development in Solomon Islands in two interlinked 
ways. Firstly, geographical factors of smallness, 
dispersal and isolation have a direct impact on 
costs and competitiveness that are largely not 
amenable to policy solutions. Secondly, these cost 
disadvantages are compounded by weaknesses 
in public administration and the provision 
of public goods, also related to smallness and 
dispersal, which further increase business costs. 
Cross-country studies using firm-level data have 
confirmed that smallness increases business costs, 
due to the absence of agglomeration benefits, 
high transport costs, and the higher costs of 
infrastructure services. Winters and Martin (2004), 
for example, show that manufacturing firms in 
countries the size of Solomon Islands would have to 
pay either negative wages or earn a negative return 
on invested capital if they were to compete on price 
with firms located in larger countries. Higher costs 
mean that it is difficult to produce manufactured 
goods for export to competitive markets. At the 
same time, higher costs erode domestic production, 
with local firms unable to compete against cheaper 
imports from lower cost economies. 
These realities have not precluded development 
in small states (Easterly and Kraay 2000; Bertram 
2006). Rather, small states around the world, like 
Solomon Islands, have relied on various forms of 
rents, especially aid and natural resource extraction, 
to support economic growth and living standards. 
Rent-based strategies — ranging from regulatory 
arbitrage in Caribbean financial centres to extrac-
tion of geostrategic rents by the US Compact coun-
tries of the North Pacific — have often been very 
successful for small states, with most analyses sug-
gesting that small states are no poorer and grow no 
slower than larger states. 
Aid has been an important part of economic 
development progress for many small states (Bertam 
2003). Small states receive a vastly disproportion-
ate share of global aid flows. Aid for the 50 smallest 
countries is around 8.3 per cent of Gross National 
Income, compared to 0.5 per cent for lower-middle 
income countries overall. Detailed cross-country 
analysis has shown that the closeness of political 
relationships between metropolitan countries and 
small island states exerts a determining impact on 
income and income growth in small states, largely 
due to the importance of aid and fiscal transfers for 
small-state living standards (Bertram 2003).
A wide literature also details the important 
role played by natural resource extraction in small 
states. Recent World Bank analysis finds that, of 
19 small countries that experienced a sustained 
period of rapid growth since 1980, natural resource 
extractive industries were an important driver in 
seven cases, while tourism growth played a major 
role in nine cases (World Bank 2010). While natural 
resource extraction may be impacted by higher 
cost structures in small states, profits can still be 
generated for as long as revenues exceed costs. 
Strong tourism performance reflects the inherent 
imperfectly competitive nature of the global 
tourism market, with tourists prepared to pay more 
for unique experiences. 
Many small states also generate income from 
sources that Solomon Islands has not yet been 
able to realise. Reflecting limited opportunities for 
labour-intensive domestic production, small states 
have been more successful in mobilising diaspora 
to take advantage of employment opportunities in 
Figure 9: Infrastructure Indicators – Solomon Islands 
and Small States
Solomon Islands lags significantly behind the median small 
economy in access to nearly all forms of economic infrastructure.
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larger, lower cost, higher productivity economies 
(Bertram 2006). Remittances to the 50 smallest 
countries are equal to around 6.7 per cent of GDP 
on average, reaching around 25 per cent of GDP in 
Tonga and Samoa (World Bank 2013). Small states 
have also been very successful in manipulating their 
jurisdictional autonomy to generate regulatory rents 
from various sources. The emergence of large finan-
cial services sectors in some small economies (espe-
cially those in close proximity to large economies) 
has reflected successful regulatory arbitrage of tax 
laws and financial regulations to attract economic 
activities that are mobile and relatively less reliant 
on higher cost domestic inputs (Bertram 2006). 
With income from state-captured rents large 
relative to income from production and exporting 
in the private sector, small states can often afford 
large governments. The public sector plays a key 
role in supporting living standards in the context of 
often limited private sector opportunities, and often 
provides a reserve source of employment. Evidence 
is clear that small states tend, on average, to have 
both larger governments, in terms of government 
expenditure as a share of GDP, and larger public 
sectors, in terms of payroll expenditure as a share 
of GDP (World Bank 2011).
The Solomon Island Economy in Context
Decades of research demonstrates that scale and 
concentration are a prerequisite to productiv-
ity in both the public and private sector. Inability 
to achieve competitiveness in the production of 
tradables has important implications regarding the 
likely pace and nature of economic growth, under 
any policy settings. This reality is reflected in the 
experience of small states globally, where economic 
development has generally been achieved through 
international transfers, worker remittances, and 
natural resource rents (including from tourism), 
rather than economic diversification. 
Acceptance that growth is more likely to come  
from these non-traditional sources has important 
implications for current and future policy priorities. 
Improvements to the business environment 
can certainly assist firms, especially in the non-
tradables sector, to emerge and grow in response 
to domestic demand created by rent-based 
inflows. But such reforms are extremely unlikely, 
on their own, to drive rapid growth or deliver the 
expansion of economic opportunities that Solomon 
Islands desperately needs. Ideologically driven 
recommendations that an improved business 
environment requires reductions in the size of the 
public sector seem perverse, given the reliance of 
the private sector on public spending, the public 
sector’s vital role in employment provision, clear 
existing weaknesses in the provision of the public 
goods and services on which businesses rely, and 
the need for a capable and well-resourced state to 
mitigate conflict pressures through broadening 
access to services, security, and justice. 
6. Implications for the International  
    Community
The implications of all of this for the international 
community are clear. Firstly, reliance on inter-
national fiscal and capacity support for delivery 
of basic public goods and services is unlikely to 
decline over the medium term, given the expected 
exhaustion of logging, long lead times for prospec-
tive mining operations, and the absence of other 
growth drivers. Secondly, this international support 
could usefully shift focus from broad business-
enabling environment reforms towards managing 
the pressures inherent in what is likely to remain 
an economy concentrated around natural resource 
extraction and the public sector. Thirdly, the best 
long-term prospects for real convergence in liv-
ing standards between Solomon Islands and near-
by large markets will come only from far deeper 
economic integration — basic facts of economic 
geography mean that UN Millenium Development 
Goals’ level of living standards are unlikely to be 
affordable if Solomon Islanders remain separated, 
by accident of arbitrary postcolonial boundaries, 
from the productivity and prosperity that economic 
concentration offers. 
In very tangible terms, there are three clear 
priorities for short-term action: 
1.    establishment of adequate institutional capacities 
for managing prospective mining operations
2.   improvements in the services and basic adminis-
tration of Honiara, where the population can be 
expected to continue to grow rapidly
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3.    increased public investment in direct 
employment generation to mitigate the risks 
of rapid urbanisation in an economy unable to 
spontaneously generate sufficient private sector 
opportunities. 
Over the medium term, progress must be 
made towards deeper forms of economic integra-
tion, including regularisation of fiscal and capac-
ity support and the expansion of labour mobility 
options for Solomon Islanders. 
Managing the Transition to Mining
Successful management of the mining transition, if 
it is to occur, will require long-term commitment 
from donor countries, involving provision of 
long-term technical assistance. Preemptive, high-
quality capacity support to the relevant agencies 
will be required for development of mining policy 
and legislation. These capacities are simply not 
available within the Solomon Islands public service 
and will need to be externally provided. Even then, 
de jure measures are unlikely to translate into de 
facto outcomes unless accompanied by ongoing 
in-line technical assistance in relevant ministries 
during the negotiation of access and taxation and 
royalty agreements, and for ongoing compliance 
and monitoring. International technical assistance 
will also be needed for establishing systems 
to ensure the negotiation of fair and durable 
agreements between mining companies and 
landowners. Specialist international capacity in 
the Inland Revenue Department will be needed 
to ensure that international mining companies 
comply with taxation requirements. Technical 
support in the Ministry of Finance will also be 
needed to implement appropriate measures for 
managing revenue flows to government. 
Capacity support, however, may not be 
enough. Global experience with mining suggests 
that effective mobilisation of international 
technical assistance may be insufficient to secure a 
fair deal between mining investors and the people 
of Solomon Islands given the difficult political-
economy context, inevitable deficits in institutional 
capacity, and very weak civil society (Ross 2004; 
Sachs and Warner 2001). Further co-ordinated 
international action may need to be taken to 
monitor and regulate the activities of mining 
firms. Australian or other large-country authorities 
with responsibility for the regulation and taxation 
of mining could be given jurisdiction to ensure 
the application and maintenance of reasonable 
standards in Solomon Islands. This sharing of 
responsibility could go further. Many of the firms 
currently involved in prospecting or mining 
activities in Solomon Islands are based in countries 
that have aid relationships with Solomon Islands. 
These countries could take greater responsibility 
for the conduct of firms operating in Solomon 
Islands and regulate their activities under home 
country legal and regulatory frameworks, given the 
potentially huge impact of these firms’ actions on 
economic development and living standards.3 
Increasing the Domestic Economic Impact of Public 
Expenditure
The public sector will remain an important direct 
and indirect source of employment in Solomon 
Islands. Whether from aid or mining rents, the 
public sector will control a large portion of econ-
omy-wide income and needs to ensure that this 
is used in ways that both help meet the rapidly 
increasing demand for jobs while avoiding the 
severe inequalities in access to resulting economic 
opportunities that played an important role in 
sparking previous conflict (Allen 2013). 
Government and donor agencies should con-
sider options for further directly increasing the 
employment intensity and local economic impact 
of public spending. Recent employment-intensive 
public works schemes in Honiara may provide a use-
ful model. Donor agencies could give greater weight 
to local economic and employment impacts when 
designing major infrastructure projects, with a grow-
ing body of regional experience providing lessons as 
to how this can be successfully accomplished.4
As well as bringing important efficiency 
benefits through reduced transaction costs and 
better alignment with government priorities 
when accompanied by the necessary capacity 
development and supplementation activities, 
increasing use of budget support modalities 
would inevitably ensure that aid flows had a far 
larger economic and employment impact. Rather 
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than channeling expenditure to consulting firms, 
management contractors, and international supply 
companies, resources could be funneled through 
ministries and public sector procurement systems. 
There is clear international evidence that such 
modalities have far greater local economic impact, 
and would increase direct and indirect public 
employment, including spurring private sector 
development through increased opportunities for 
local firms supplying government contracts (Peace 
Dividend Trust 2009; Carnahan 2004). 
Improving the Administration of Honiara
With public expenditure driving much of 
Solomon Islands private sector activity, Honiara 
will continue to grow. In the context of rapid 
urbanisation, poor infrastructure, services, and 
administration in Honiara pose a threat to security 
and social cohesion. At the same time, economic 
concentration around a well-functioning Honiara 
offers Solomon Islands’ best opportunity for 
agglomeration-related benefits of productivity 
growth, including private sector development and 
increased employment. 
Important changes are required to maximise 
the potential benefits of urbanisation while 
managing the risks. Firstly, continued investment 
is required in both urban and rural services and 
infrastructure. Improving access to services and 
economic infrastructure in urban areas, including 
squatter settlements, is vital to improved living 
standards, private sector development, and 
growth of employment opportunities. Deliberate 
under-provision of services and infrastructure in 
informal settlement is ineffective in discouraging 
urbanisation, and simply erodes living standards, 
creates inefficiency, and increases pressure on social 
cohesion (World Bank 2009). But service delivery 
standards must also be improved in rural areas and 
provincial centres. Urbanisation motivated by a 
desire to access decent services, rather than more 
productive employment opportunities, will cause 
congestion without providing any economic or 
efficiency benefits. 
Secondly, infrastructure links between Honiara 
and provincial centres need to be improved. 
This can allow the benefits of economic growth 
in Honiara to be shared more widely, through 
opportunities to supply labour, goods, and services 
from other areas. Reliable and affordable transport 
links can ensure that people can move between 
city and rural areas in response to short-term 
changes in economic conditions and opportunities, 
providing some reversibility in decisions to migrate 
and preventing the emergence of a trapped urban 
poor (World Bank 2011).
Finally, improved administration of Honiara 
land is vital. Lack of access to land and dysfunction 
in land markets is undermining living standards 
and private sector development in Honiara 
(World Bank 2010; Storey 2003; Connell 2012). 
The inability to formally transact land is leading 
to the emergence of various illegitimate and 
unevenly accessible informal transaction systems, 
and resulting in artificial scarcity and inefficient 
use. Unmanaged urbanisation encroaching 
on customary land holdings around Honiara’s 
borders presents risks of resentment and conflict, 
echoing dynamics that triggered the 1998–2003 
tension (Allen 2013). A thorough overhaul of 
land administration is required. Measures that 
provide formal recognition of land ownership 
and transactions in squatter areas would provide 
vital security to new migrants (AusAID 2008). 
Reforms to land administration in urban Honiara, 
where land has typically been alienated from 
traditional ownership, could be implemented 
without the political difficulties associated with 
customary land rights. Global experience suggests 
that the customary owners of land surrounding 
Honiara would be more than willing to engage in 
private transactions to free up additional land for 
settlement if an adequate institutional framework 
for such transactions can be provided (AusAID 2008).
Mainstreaming Fiscal and Capacity Support 
Over the longer term, the broader modalities 
of international assistance require revision. 
International aid flows to Solomon Islands are 
currently around US$330 million per year, and 
have averaged around 50 per cent of GDP for the 
past decade. This equates to around US$600 per 
Solomon Islander. While aid flows are likely to 
decline following the ramping down of the security 
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presence, continued aid flows of around 30 per cent 
of GDP could be reasonably expected.5 
Such dependence on external fiscal support 
is not unusual in the Pacific, where far greater 
levels of aid (on a per capita basis) are provided to 
French territories and the US Compact countries 
of the North Pacific. However, whereas aid 
flows in these contexts are channeled directly 
through government budgetary systems (albeit 
under various externally imposed controls), 
aid to Solomon Islands is channeled to a large 
extent through project modalities, with more 
than 125 projects currently on the development 
budget, covering everything from agricultural 
development to immunisation to infrastructure. 
This fragmentation of aid through a profusion of 
projects leads to substantial transaction costs, with 
rituals of project design, negotiation, supervision 
and monitoring occupying a huge amount of 
officials’ time, while the compromised capacity of 
government to impose overall strategic direction 
and the inevitable resulting gaps and overlaps 
have important deleterious impacts on efficiency 
and service delivery. The broadly acknowledged 
fiction of sustainability within project cycles leads 
to a stop/go dynamic, causing disruption and 
backsliding in vital areas. 
At the same time, continued reliance 
on long-term capacity supplementation is 
broadly acknowledged in vital areas of public 
administration, including economic management, 
justice, health, and education. The extended 
provision of international technical assistance has, 
counter to common mantras of sustainability, made 
its withdrawal less viable. During the period of the 
RAMSI intervention, ministries have proliferated 
along with the tasks that they are expected to 
fulfill (World Bank 2011). Complexity of systems 
has increased as donor agencies have sought to 
implant best practice models (examples range 
from use of medium-term budget and planning 
frameworks to the proliferation of government 
agencies to the ‘modernising’ of various legislation 
and regulations). As a consequence, there is now 
an even more pronounced divergence between the 
intended reach and sophistication of centralised 
state institutions and what can actually be sustained 
by local capacity than existed prior to the tension. 
Meeting these ongoing technical assistance needs 
will be costly, but — given the extent to which 
management of upcoming challenges will rely on 
capable and effective public institutions — less 
costly than leaving them unmet.
Government and donors will need to be 
realistic about the need for both fiscal and capacity 
support over the long term. Viewing fiscal and 
capacity support not as transitional, but rather as 
the ongoing cost of delivering functioning state 
institutions would free up space for more efficient 
modalities for providing this support. Explicit 
recognition of the provision of state institutions and 
services as a collaborative endeavor would:
•   facilitate frank conversation about the 
appropriate division of responsibilities between 
government and its partners
•   increase the dependability of vital support, 
reducing uncertainty to Solomon Islanders and 
potential investors 
•   open space for considering the potentially 
negative governance and political-economy 
implications of shared services, and how these 
risks could be best managed.6 
Such a need for ‘co-production’ of state 
institutions in fragile and post-conflict settings 
is frankly acknowledged in recent literature, and 
international dialogue around the G7+ and OECD 
brokered a ‘new deal for fragile states’ (Krasner 
2004; Matanock 2009).
Loosening Constraints to Labour Mobility
Finally, even with a successful transition to mining, 
a better-managed Honiara, and increased efficiency 
in the collaborative delivery of state institutions 
and services, increasing options for labour mobility 
is vital. Upcoming demographic challenges and 
associated pressures on social cohesion are simply 
too great to be addressed through domestic 
policy measures alone. Smallness and dispersal 
undermine productivity and therefore incomes and 
employment opportunities. The best opportunity 
for improving the employment prospects of 
Solomon Islands’ growing youth population is 
therefore to allow them to move to and work in 
centres of economic concentration overseas, where 
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scale can be achieved and prospects of productive 
employment are greater. Unfortunately, such 
opportunities for Solomon Islanders are currently 
heavily constrained. 
The extent of these constraints can be observed 
in demographic data. Differences in projected 
population growth between Solomon Islands 
and other Pacific island countries are only partly 
attributable to fertility rates. In Tonga and Samoa, 
for example, population growth is expected to be 
almost completely offset by emigration, reflecting 
the presence of concessional access arrangements 
and large diaspora populations in nearby large 
economies (Bedford 2012). By even greater contrast, 
current policy concerns in the Cook Islands and the 
North Pacific include that free movement of labour 
to New Zealand and the United States, respectively, 
will lead to depopulation. 
Neither New Zealand nor Australia offers any 
preferential permanent access to Solomon Island-
ers, despite much higher living standards in other 
Pacific countries that are provided with preferential 
access quotas (with the exception of Kiribati). With 
low incomes and weak institutions for human capital 
development, Solomon Islanders are poorly placed 
to qualify for permanent residence under points-
based systems (Bedford 2012; Luthria et al. 2006). 
Solomon Islanders are also heavily underrepresented 
in Australian and New Zealand temporary worker 
schemes that offer short-term work opportunities 
for Pacific islanders (Department of Labor 2012). 
Increasing options for Solomon Islanders to 
travel to and work in Australia and New Zealand 
would have several important benefits for Solomon 
Islanders. Firstly, with per capita incomes in 
Australia currently around 3600 per cent of those 
in Solomon Islands, it is clear that labour mobility 
options would increase the incomes of migrant 
workers. Secondly, broader Pacific experience 
demonstrates the key role that remittances can 
play in supporting incomes and living standards 
for family and community members remaining in 
Solomon Islands. Remittance flows in the Pacific 
have been shown to be enduring and robust to 
changing economic conditions in the receiving 
countries, and to support improved education 
outcomes, housing quality, and subjective 
wellbeing (Mackenzie and Gibson 2010; Gibson 
and Mackenzie 2011). Thirdly, the existence of an 
outward migration channel could play an important 
role in reducing youth population growth and its 
associated pressures on social cohesion in Honiara. 
More young men working overseas will reduce the 
stock of those frustrated, out of work, and drinking 
kwaso on the streets of White River. Finally, typical 
patterns of circular migration found elsewhere in 
the Pacific suggest that the building up of overseas 
diaspora populations can bring long-term benefits 
in terms of knowledge and skill transfer, and 
increased access to overseas markets and education 
opportunities (Gibson and Mackenzie 2010). 
Large regional economies also have much 
to gain from increased labour mobility. Labour 
mobility represents a low-cost means of achieving 
improvements in living standards and public 
sector administration in countries where there is 
a sustained aid relationship. It is no coincidence 
that those Pacific island countries that perform 
highest on international metrics of governance 
quality and government effectiveness are those 
with the strongest circular migration links to larger, 
wealthier economies, with public sector officials 
often the beneficiaries of associated education and 
knowledge transfer opportunities. Given the aging 
populations and reported shortages of low-skilled 
labour in Australia and New Zealand, increasing 
labour access would also deliver direct economic 
benefits to these countries.
7. Conclusion: Continuity and Transition 
There have been important improvements in liv-
ing standards in Solomon Islands since the tension, 
many of them due to the regional RAMSI inter-
vention. The overall structure of the economy has, 
however, changed very little. Despite concerted 
efforts to provide security and restore services, 
improve macroeconomic management, and imple-
ment improvements to the business environment, 
the Solomon Islands economy remains centred on 
logging and the Honiara-based public sector. Aid 
continues to support basic service delivery, spur 
significant employment and economic activity, and 
finance a large current account deficit. Internation-
al technical assistance continues to play a vital role 
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in providing many of the state functions on which 
the private sector relies. 
This should not be interpreted as evidence 
of failure. The structure of the Solomon Islands 
economy is consistent with fundamental facts of 
economic geography. All international evidence 
suggests that economic growth will be unevenly 
distributed across space, that it is attracted to scale 
and concentration, and that it is deterred by isola-
tion and dispersal. There is, therefore, no reason 
to expect the emergence of a diversified, competi-
tive economy in Solomon Islands, even under ideal 
business environment settings (which are, in any 
case, well beyond the current fiscal and technical 
reach of the government). 
Recognition of geographical realities and the 
likely trajectory of development in Solomon Islands 
should inform important changes in the priorities 
and objectives of international development 
support. Over the short term, the focus of 
international development assistance must shift 
from broad reforms to enable a business-friendly 
environment, towards addressing the specific 
pressures associated with what is likely to remain 
an economy concentrated on natural resource 
extraction and the public sector. 
Over the longer term, the convergence in living 
standards between Solomon Islands and nearby 
large markets will come only from deeper economic 
integration. Those living in small, remote towns 
in Australia or New Zealand often achieve very 
high living standards through accessing centrally 
provided services and by exploiting their ability 
to move to work in larger, more productive areas. 
It is not clear why these options should be denied 
to Solomon Islanders. Increased labour mobility, 
sharing of capacity, and joint responsibility for 
the functioning of public institutions and services 
would allow realisation of the full potential of the 
Solomon Islands economy. The regional economy 
has much to gain from a secure Solomon Islands, 
a highly productive Solomon Islands labour 
force (working wherever it is has most to offer), 
well-managed development of Solomon Islands’ 
extensive natural resource wealth, and the shared 
creation and maintenance of an institutional 
environment, within which tourism and other 
niche economic opportunities can be pursued by 
local and international investors. 
Economic integration of this depth and breadth, 
while necessary, raises new and complex political 
questions. Enhanced co-production of state institu-
tions inevitably exacerbates a moral hazard problem 
already apparent under the shallower integration of 
the RAMSI period: how can responsibility for basic 
services and functions be shared internationally 
without further reducing political accountability 
of Solomon Island’s elected leaders? Equally, what 
risks are associated with Solomon Islanders being 
increasingly dependent on institutions and services 
supported by foreign governments that they have  
no means of holding to account? Discussion of the  
possible divisions of responsibility and shared acc-
ountability arrangements that such co-production 
will require is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
these questions will need to be squarely confronted 
if the necessary progress is to occur. 
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Endnotes
1 The pace of revenue growth has slowed significantly 
since 2011.
2 The International Growth Commission suggests 
that sustained and rapid economic growth is likely 
to rely on the supply of international markets with 
higher value-add manufactured goods or services. 
This conclusion is based on exhaustive analysis of the 
experience of countries that have recently experienced 
episodes or rapid, private-sector driven growth.
3 There is some precedent for such international 
regulation. Canada recently passed amendments to 
its Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act to allow 
broader enforcement when the entire illegal transaction 
occurs abroad. Recent attempts have also been made in 
both the United States and Australia to subject overseas 
operations of locally headquartered multinationals to 
domestic laws for the protection of human rights (Deva 
2004). See Stiglitz (2007) for a review of the economic 
case for international regulation of multinational 
corporations and progress achieved to date.
4 The World Bank has successfully experimented with 
procurement processes to support the development of 
private sector road maintenance providers in Samoa, 
allowing increased domestic economic impact and 
reducing reliance on foreign contractors. Reliance on 
local providers has led to improvements in the quality 
and timeliness of maintenance work.
5 Mining developments seem unlikely to generate 
sufficient revenues to completely substitute aid flows 
even over longer time horizons, but especially in the 
short-term, given that lead times for development of 
identified mining projects will likely exceed the life of 
extractive logging activities.
6 Fiscal transfers play an important role in spatial 
redistribution between areas that are and are not 
favored by economic geography in many contexts. 
In the Australia, for example, the GST system plays a 
similar role in spatial redistribution, evening out some 
of the disparities in services between states that would 
otherwise accompany the concentration of economic 
activity in coastal cities and mining towns. Federal 
grants play a similar role in the United States. 
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